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WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS. By Abigail M. 
Themstrom.t A Twentieth Century Fund Study. Cambridge, 
Ma.: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 316. $25.00. 
PhilipP. Frlckey2 
For a host of reasons, some identifiable and others elusive, vot-
ing rights appear to differ fundamentally from other civil rights. 
Normatively, Americans somehow sense that voting is a basic right 
of citizenship. Moreover, our democratic ethos (and perhaps my-
thos) suggests that voting is a powerful, yet highly legitimate, in-
strument of social change. In particular, if those citizens who have 
been traditionally excluded from power have a fair opportunity to 
vote, so the theory goes, they can effectively yet peacefully force our 
representative institutions to undo the present effects of past dis-
crimination to the extent consistent with other important societal 
interests. The concrete civil rights reforms that result may please 
no one completely, but the process by which they come about legiti-
mates them nonetheless. This basic distinction between fair process 
and fair outcome, rooted in much conventional American public 
law theory,J is perhaps clearest of all in our attitude toward voting 
rights. 
After judicial efforts failed to undo a century of voting discrim-
ination in the South, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 
1965. That statute applied two stringent remedies to certain por-
tions of the country-in effect, major regions of the South-where 
voting discrimination had been rampant. First, it outlawed certain 
barriers preventing minorities from registering to vote, such as the 
literacy test. Second, it forbade a covered jurisdiction from chang-
l. Senior Research Associate at the Gordon Public Policy Center, Brandeis Univer-
sity, and former Lecturer on Social Studies at Harvard University. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author thanks James 
Blacksher, Daniel Farber, and Gerald Torres for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this review. 
3. The obvious citation is probably J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Con-
sider also the "principle of institutional settlement" at the core of the approach found in H. 
HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 4-5 (tent. ed. 1958): 
Implicit in every such system of procedures is the central idea of law-an idea 
which can be described as the principle of institutional settlement . . . . The alterna-
tive to disintegrating resort to violence is the establishment of regularized and 
peaceable means of decision. The principle of institutional settlement expresses the 
judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived at as a result of duly established 
procedures for making decisions of this kind ought to be accepted as binding on the 
whole society unless and until they are duly changed. 
Needless to say, the form/substance dichotomy is controversial in public law scholarship. 
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ing "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice, or procedure with respect to voting" unless it obtained 
preclearance from either the Department of Justice or the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Preclearance 
was available only if the jurisdiction proved that the electoral 
change had neither the purpose nor the effect of "denying or abridg-
ing the right to vote on account of race or color." Congress origi-
nally gave the Act only a five-year lifespan, but it reenacted the 
statute in 1970, 1975, and 1982. 
Although the Voting Rights Act remains a vital component of 
American civil rights law, it has received relatively little careful 
scrutiny from scholars and journalists. In large part, this lack of 
attention may reflect the overriding American complacency about 
voting rights. Although the dissecting of sacred cows is a familiar 
type of scholarly endeavor, perhaps voting rights are so central to 
our civil religion as to be immune to skeptical inquiry. 
Abigail M. Thernstrom has now gone where others have 
largely feared to tread. Her well-researched, thoughtful, and highly 
readable book presents a thoroughgoing critique of what she views 
as unthinking and unjustified affirmative action in American elec-
toral politics. She challenges conventional wisdom about enhancing 
minority officeholding, yet largely avoids simplistic criticisms. That 
ultimately I remained largely unmoved by her analysis perhaps sug-
gests-aside from my own bias-simply that no single book can be 
definitive in this field. At a minimum, her book calls for an equally 
well-researched and thoughtful answer from those who are 
unpersuaded. 
In a nutshell, Thernstrom argues that the Act was designed 
solely to enfranchise southern blacks. This single purpose has been 
transformed over time, she contends. For one thing, congressional 
amendments have brought lingual minorities as well as racial mi-
norities within the statutory protections. Second, the courts have 
applied the preclearance requirement to all changes in electoral for-
mat, not simply to methods of disenfranchisement. In addition, as 
she sees it, the courts, and particularly the Department of Justice, 
have interpreted the preclearance requirement as prohibiting even 
the slightest electoral changes by covered jurisdictions that, while 
allowing full access to the ballot for minorities, undermine-or per-
haps just fail to promote-the ability of minorities to elect minority 
officeholders, rather than simply candidates worthy of minority 
support. Finally, in the 1982 amendments, Congress provided a na-
tionwide judicial remedy when electoral structures that have not 
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been modified since 1964 (and thus have not faced preclearance) 
have a discriminatory effect upon minority voting strength. 
These developments, Thernstrom argues, have turned the Vot-
ing Rights Act from a method of enfranchisement into an entitle-
ment of meaningful minority voting power, measured by the 
minority's ability to elect candidates of its own race. As such, she 
concludes, the statute unduly fractures American politics along ra-
cial lines. This exacerbation of racial conflict is all the more objec-
tionable, in her view, because the institution ultimately responsible 
for it-Congress--has never clearly understood or carefully de-
bated the utility of affirmative action in electoral politics. "The 
right to vote no longer means simply the right to enter a polling 
booth and pull the lever. Yet the issue retains a simple Fifteenth 
Amendment aura-an aura that is pure camouflage." 
I do not wish to overstate Thernstrom's argument. She is sen-
sitive to the lingering problems of voting discrimination. She recog-
nizes that in some contexts all-white legislative bodies are subject to 
question. In her final chapter, in what I found to be her most per-
ceptive discussion, she acknowledges that in many rural southern 
areas blacks continue to be shut out of electoral politics, and that 
intrusive relief under the Voting Rights Act is justifiable in those 
circumstances. In short, she wields a scalpel, not a cleaver. 
Although Thernstrom proposes important changes in the inter-
pretation of the Voting Rights Act, she would not eviscerate it. She 
would construe the preclearance requirement as prohibiting juris-
dictions from backsliding on minority voter influence. In her view, 
the 1982 amendment providing nationwide protection against dis-
criminatory electoral systems should outlaw situations in which the 
minority community is truly frozen out of the political process. 
Both of these conclusions are outgrowths of her attempt to respect 
congressional intent and to limit federal intrusion into local political 
affairs. 
I cannot attempt in this space to present a detailed answer to 
her analysis. I think she exaggerates when she asserts that the only 
purpose of the original Voting Rights Act was to enable minorities 
to cast votes. Moreover, she fails to perceive that statutes, espe-
cially civil rights statutes, should have some room to grow as soci-
ety adapts to them. For example, the employment discrimination 
prohibition of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had, by 
1979, evolved so that it did not bar all affirmative action efforts to 
promote minority employment.4 Title VII gradually changed hue 
4. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Statutory evolution in gen· 
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without much intermediate congressional reconsideration of the 
statute. In contrast, the Voting Rights Act has been reenacted, and 
strengthened, three times in its twenty-three year life. From a for-
malistic standpoint, at least, the evolving nature of the Voting 
Rights Act seems unobjectionable. 
It is true, I think, that since 1965 Congress as a whole has not 
carefully deliberated all sides of the issues Thernstrom has raised. 
It is also true that the civil rights lobby has powerful muscles to flex 
on the voting rights question and that opponents have proved to be 
weak and disorganized. Although careful legislative deliberation 
insulated from lobbying pressures would seem to be the Madisonian 
ideal, I, for one, find its absence less troubling when those histori-
cally disadvantaged end up prevailing. I would not join, without 
strong evidence, Thernstrom's speculation that civil rights lobbyists 
may be wrong about what is best for minorities. 
At times, Thernstrom's style is rather aloof and bloodless. For 
example, throughout most of the book she treats Mobile v. Bolden,s 
a principal constitutional voting rights case, as an abstract legal 
problem; only in her final chapter does she present some careful and 
sensitive insights into the nature of race and politics in Mobile, 
Alabama. 
A more general example of perhaps undue abstraction is her 
treatment of at-large elections. If there is racial bloc voting and 
blacks constitute a minority in a city, blacks cannot elect any candi-
date of their choice to a city council elected at-large; if the minority 
community is geographically concentrated, in contrast, a ward-
election format may well result in the election of one or more candi-
dates supported by the minority community. At-large elections are 
thus suspect under the Voting Rights Act in some circumstances. 
Thernstrom counters: "Where white candidates (as well as black 
and Hispanic) actively seek minority votes and those votes often 
influence the outcome of every electoral contest, at-large elections 
may provide fewer [minority] seats but more influence-and by that 
token more representation." That seems undisputably true, but 
how relevant is it? Thernstrom frankly admits optimism about 
whites being willing to vote for black candidates, and about candi-
dates ordinarily profiting from courting minority voters despite po-
tential white voter backlash. Indeed, she tells the reader that 
"[t]oday there remain almost no jurisdictions in which the preferred 
candidates of minority voters experience white harassment." To 
era!, and the evolution of Title VII in particular, are discussed in Eskridge, Dynamic Statu-
tory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). 
5. 446 u.s. 55 (1980). 
1988] BOOK REVIEW 455 
her credit, she admits that some will disagree with her sociological 
generalizations. Where one stands on issues like this, she rightly 
notes, "determines one's judgment on every concrete issue involving 
minority voting rights." Unfortunately, Themstrom does not-in 
fairness, probably cannot-demonstrate the accuracy of her gener-
alizations in contrast to those of less sanguine observers.6 
Two jarring, although probably minor, errors in her book exac-
erbated my sense that Themstrom sometimes lacked a full measure 
of the voting rights situation. She quotes with approval language 
from a Fifth Circuit voting rights decision and attributes it to 
"Judge Leon Higginbotham." She means Patrick Higginbotham, of 
course, the thoughtful, conservative-and white-Fifth Circuit 
judge, not Leon Higginbotham, the thoughtful, liberal-and 
black-Third Circuit judge. In a footnote, she misidentifies Judge 
John Minor Wisdom, a pillar of liberal voting rights jurisprudence 
even in the bad old days in the South, as "Judge Minor Wisdom." 
Unfortunately, this will remind readers with long memories of the 
taunting misnomers once applied to Judge Wisdom by those op-
posed to basic civil rights for southern blacks-names like "Judge 
Major Ignorance" and "Judge John Minus Wisdom." These errors 
were no doubt inadvertent, and one trusts they will be corrected in 
later printings. 
In the last analysis, Themstrom presents a plausible argument 
that the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted, unduly burdens the 
"melting pot" phenomenon that, she assumes, characterizes most 
American politics today, including local politics. She may well be 
correct. I have always been skeptical of that melting pot, however, 
for it seems to be an invitation to minorities to jump into the pot at 
the risk of losing what is unique about them. It may well be that 
America has advanced so far that the dominant society is now, by 
and large, asking minorities to join it. It might just be, though, that 
"they" would just as soon not be homogenized to the point of be-
coming interchangeable with "us." Moreover, it just might be that 
minority self-determination will, in the long run, enrich society 
more than any simple homogenization could ever do. Self-determi-
nation and empowerment may simply be valuable in themselves. 
On these matters too, as Thernstrom recognizes, where one stands 
will determine how one ultimately evaluates concrete voting rights 
6. Her discussion of the question of at-large elections would have been rendered less 
abstract, and more complete, by a consideration ofP. HEILIG & R. MUNDT, YouR VOICE AT 
CITY HALL (1984), which presents a balanced empirical perspective on the utility of at-large 
elections. 
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problems, and more generally whether one condemns or praises the 
fostering of minority officeholding under the Voting Rights Act. 
Getting beyond racism, as Justice Blackmun recognized in his 
concurrence in Bakke, may require consideration of race in the con-
text of group as well as individual rights. Does the Voting Rights 
Act, by balkanizing the races in electoral politics, frustrate progress 
toward the elimination of racism? Or does the Act, by helping em-
power minorities, promise to contribute to the eventual eradication 
of racism? In part, at least, these questions turn on short-term ver-
sus long-term perspectives. Thernstrom and those who dissent 
from her views may agree on ultimate ends, but disagree on the 
means and the time frame involved. Her book is a major contribu-
tion that should foster clearer thinking and more careful analysis of 
these important issues. 
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Kermit L. Hal/4 
In the clutter of patriotic and commemorative events that have 
dominated (and will likely continue to dominate) this Bicentennial, 
we might well pause to reflect on the sage advice that the mayor of 
Salina, Kansas gave when asked some years ago how best to cele-
brate the Declaration of Independence. "[C]ome up with [some-
thing]," he pleaded, "that somebody will give a damn about in 50 
years."s Much of what has transpired so far will probably fail the 
1. Librarian and Curator, New York Public Library. 
2. Consultant, New York Public Library. 
3. Magazine consultant. 
4. Professor of History and Law, University of Florida. 
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